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ABDI
ISMAIL SAMATAR not provide an explanation of the origins and the nature of this catastrophe. The ferocity of the civil war and the magnitude of its destruction urgently calls for an analysis of what went wrong, and why such a seemingly homogeneous society has descended into abyss. This short article challenges the recent use of ethnicity, particularly in the popular media, to explain intra-communal struggles in many parts of the world, and provides both a summary of, and a commentary on, the woefully inadequate scholarly literature about the origin and nature of the tragic collapse of the state and the complete breakdown of civil order in Somalia.
The centrality of kinship in understanding contemporary Somali politics and its tendency towards fragmentation and anarchy has long been stressed by a number of scholars. Others, however, while ready to acknowledge the importance of culture in appreciating the contours of recent developments, maintain that the significance of traditional relations has been changed almost out of recognition by the evolving interactions that have taken place between human beings. Hence the need to unravel the dynamics of political and economic processes which condition the structure of social relations in a given community at a particular historical juncture. Democracy: a study of pastoralism and politics among the northern Somali of the Horn of Africa (London, i962), and The Modern History of Somaliland: from nation to state (New York, I 965). The first book, based on field-work conducted during 1955-7, had two rather simple but strong messages for readers: (i) the Somalis have a highly equalitarian society with pastoralism as a base, although livestock, the most vital economic asset, is not evenly distributed; and (ii) the fundamental organising principle of their way of life is segmentary clanism. In the absence of institutionalized state structures and any nation-wide governmental authority, civil associations along clan-lines and loyalty to one's lineage are the defining characteristics of Somali politics and social life. Over three decades later this point was emphasised again by Lewis in his revised, updated (from I980), and expanded edition of A Modern History of Somalia: nation and state in the Horn of Africa (Boulder and London, I 988):
With the increasing spread of western education, the growth of modern towns, and the gradual but quite unmistakable formation of new social classes, clan loyalties now fell into place as one component in a complex of diverse political attachments. Yet within this cluster of allegiances, for the majority of the population those bonds based on clanship... remained the most pervasive, the most commanding, and above all the most insidious (p. i66).
Although A Pastoral Democracy was researched at the tail-end of British rule in northern Somalia and published after decolonisation, Lewis's description of the pastoralism and associated democratic culture could well have been written a century earlier. The imposition of colonial rule on stateless societies, the new dynamics of social relations, and the transformation of the pastoral economy are all deemed to be mere quantitative alterations in Somali society rather than fundamental modifications of pre-colonial tradition. By evading the qualitative nature of the changes experienced, the traditionalists are able to avoid systematic analysis of any mutations of the social structures and the governing ethos that might have taken place in the last century. Thus, contemporary Somalis are said to be pastoral democrats who are equalitarian, albeit without marshalling any evidence to verify such a proclamation.6 What is amazing is that those who postulate the traditionalist thesis and subscribe to its assumptions have not seen the need to update A Pastoral Democracy, given the phenomenal growth of livestock and urbanisation, and the development of non-traditional nodes of power.
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Such static reading of social history makes the analysis of social change mechanical, linear, and simplistic. Consequently, people and the communities in which they live have little ability to innovate, to learn from others, to engage in self-improvement or self-destruction, and to undergo social transformation.7 But the reality is often very different, because the inhabitants of any country are not dupes who carry the burden of history without having any capacity to alter the future course of human affairs. It is only by making such assumptions about the mesmerising power of Somali tradition that David Laitin and Said Samatar can write:
Genealogy therefore constitutes the heart of the Somali social system and is the basis of the Somali collective predilection to internal fissions and internecine sectionary conflicts as well as of the unity of thought and action among Somalis -a unity that borders on xenophobia.8 Such a portrayal of social processes ignores the critical debates during the I 970s and I980s on the significance of structure and agency.9
The The logic of the traditionalist discourse leads to the conclusion that the trouble with Somalia is the nature of its culture, grounded in the clan system, with cruel individuals proving divisive for projects of modern nation-building. However, this approach offers no answer to the following question: Since the lineage system has been part of Somali social organisation for centuries, why has this society not engaged in nihilistic fratricide before? Surely there must have been power-seeking individuals in the past?
The traditionalist thesis has five major failings: (I) it conflates kinship and current clanism; (2) it accepts the ideology of clanism as reality, and as a sufficient explanation of the on-going tragedy, without unearthing the social and the material basis of its constitution; (3) it gives excessive weight to the causal power of clanism; (4) it treats kinship as a static phenomenon; and (5) it leaves unexamined the key pillar of Somali social structure, the family.
In order to avoid these shortcomings and the constricted interpretation of Somali culture, we need to ask: What in the old system constrained dreadful men from plunging society into hell?
THE TRANSFORMATIONIST THESIS
One of the principal weaknesses of the traditionalist approach is a lack of historical specificity in the use of its key concepts, notably pastoralism and culture. Moreover, terms such as clanism, kinship, and tribalism are loosely defined, and sometimes used interchangeably without much regard to their social meaning and content. In contrast, specificity and historicity are critical to the transformationist literature. The traditionalist approach to kinship and its reinterpretation by a transformationist provide an example of the differences between the " Said Samatar, op. cit. p. 13. We need to note that the destruction of livestock and water wells, and the subjugation of the people of the northeast, was overseen by none other than General Morgan, a 'son' of that same soil. Social theorists argue that blood-ties in the old tradition were part and parcel of communitarian social relations whose primary purpose was to ensure the production of necessities in the pastoral range."3 There were two key features of this political and economic system; the household was the basic unit of production and livestock ownership, and livestock production was the primary economic enterprise. Despite differences in the ownership of livestock among the households, social stratification in the form of propertied and property-less classes did not exist in pre-colonial communitarian Somalia.
In the absence of institutionalized state structures, and given the wide distribution of the means of livelihood, no household or lineage group could muster enough resources (material and organisational) to dominate and exploit others. It is in this sense that pre-colonial Somalia was an equalitarian society. The Xeer was a social contract democratically constructed (all adult males took part in this) to check the occasional conflicts between individuals and among communities. What gave the Xeer staying power in the absence of centralised coercive machinery was the voluntarism associated with the absolute necessity of relying and living on one's labour/livestock rather than exploiting others. Such an ethic -in conjunction with Islam -prevented and restrained centrifugal tendencies in the lineage system, thereby inhibiting terrible men from plunging the community into a nightmare. This means, in the language of realist social science, that lineage in/of itself does not have any inherent causal power, and that its effects on community relations are contingent rather than necessary."4
The search for the causal forces in the destruction of Somalia must begin by tracing the nature of the changes that had taken place in the social rather than the genealogical order of this society. There are two major historical benchmarks in the evolution of contemporary Somalia: (i) the commercialization of the subsistence economy, and particularly livestock, the material backbone of the traditional way of life; and (ii) the imposition of a colonial state on a decentralized social structure, and the creation of post-pastoral democratic nodes of power. It is in the articulation of state forms and economic transformations that the current situation can be best understood.
I. Household Economy
The first order of business is to redefine 'pastoralism', the historically and analytically imprecise term used by many writers to characterise individuals and communities who make a living by raising livestock in semi-arid regions of the Third World.'5 It needs to be emphasised that the nature of a social system is not defined by the instruments or methods used by producers, but rather by the relations into which various groups have entered to produce and reproduce the existing social order. Consequently, pastoralism is a method of livestock production that can exist under a variety of historical conditions. For example, 'communitarian pastoralism' is a social system in which the production of use-values predominates, while 'peripheral capitalist pastoralism' involves the creation of exchange-values as well. In the latter case, pastoral activities become central to the reproduction of a larger social constellation of which the producers are a part.
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Pre-colonial Somali society was stateless in character, lacking any institutionalized hierarchy. All the adult members were engaged in the principal mode of production, 'communitarian pastoralism', which lacked the forms of oppression associated with class societies, although gender-based exploitation was a characteristic feature, as confirmed by a recent study.16
As the Somali economy became an integral part of the global capitalist system, the transition from one social order to another has entailed the transformation of previous class and property relations. What is emerging bears the imprint of the new age, albeit retaining aspects of the old regime. The contemporary Somali social structure is still in transition, clearly heralding the passing of pre-capitalist communalism, with the new social order, peripheral capitalism, being qualitatively different from its pre-colonial predecessor. Contemporary pastoralism supports not only the producers but two additional and dominant social groups: the merchants and the state elite.
Although pre-colonial pastoralism was not isolated from the mercantile world,17 the latter had marginal influences over the reproduction of everyday life. But over the last century the new relationships between pastoralists, merchants, and the state have entailed the emergence of different social relations and the demise of communitarianism. During the last I5 years there has been an ongoing conflict between those who controlled that state and those members of the business class who claimed to be the legitimate appropriators of the 'surplus' generated by pastoral producers. Dispersed all over the country, and in the Ogaden, the latter may have been uniformly subject to surplus extraction irrespective of their lineage affiliation. In other words, if pastoral producers were the basis of Somali 'tradition', then the conflict over the appropriation of their surplus did not originate in the countryside.
The commoditisation of livestock and the subsequent emergence of non-producer 'claimants' has generated a new social order pregnant with a different kind of discord, in spite of the articulation of that conflict in the language of kinship. The communitarian social order based on the production of livestock, and governed by the tenets of the Xeer, as well as by the requirements of the household in a marginal environment, was no more. It was superseded by an economy in which the competition for access to commodities, the consumption of objects 633 beyond one's productive capabilities, and the accumulation of wealth in the urban centres were paramount. The ethos and the reproductive requirements of this commercial order began to erode the effectiveness of the rules of kinship.
Pastoral Politics
The imposition of a state on the old Somali order has also eroded pastoral democratic practices with far-reaching and lethal repercussions. One of the legacies of colonial administrations was the neglect and commercialization of pastoralism and peasant agriculture, and the absence of any vibrant new productive enterprises. In the context of an impoverished economy, small but rapidly growing social groups involved in trading, as well as state employees, came to demand independence in the I 95os, and the Somali Republic emerged from the union of Italian and British Somalilands on I July I 960. The leadership in both the public and private sectors was dominated by a group of Somalis who had little experience of, let alone much attachment to, either livestock and/or peasant agriculture. Moreover, they were overwhelmingly ill-equipped to devise and implement a successful strategy for development.
The new regime inherited an anaemic economy, a deepening budgetary deficit, a multi-party political system, a growing urban population largely unhinged from productive labour, and intensifying competition among the dominant social groups for resources. The deficit was solved in the short run by a combination of budget cuts and subsidies from former colonial powers. What was much more difficult to deal with was the nearly stagnant economy, and the lack of more sustainable avenues for the generation of employment. Since the country did not produce a surplus which could be reinvested to expand its productive base, resources had to be obtained from elsewhere. Again, these came from overseas in the form of loans and grants, which were tied to particular programmes which hardly benefited the pastoralism and peasant agriculture on which most Somalis depended, and did not initiate new productive enterprises.
The failure of this development strategy to improve traditional sectors, and to create new domestic forms of accumulation, made the state the most lucrative source of funds. It was the competition among the elite for these resources that ultimately led to the degeneration of the major political parties and the demise of parliamentary governance. The two organisations that dominated the political scene at the time of independence, the Somali Youth League (S.Y.L.) and the Somali This increasing fragmentation of national politics was seen by Lewis as the resurgence of traditional particularism: 'It is thus " clanship " in the technical sense, rather than tribalism, which commands allegiance and frustrates the achievement of much that is in the national interest'.1 But the pre-colonial Somali tradition of kinship should not be confused with unfettered blood-ties: the leadership in the old tradition had no public resources that they could compete for and loot, and as such the nature of the allocations made under that regime was qualitatively at variance with the modern order. The moral force of the Xeer, and the materially constraining conditions of the household economy, were not operative in the new dispensation, and therefore had little to do with tradition.
The competitive and the Xeer-less nature of the post-colonial social system made state revenues, including foreign assistance, the bone of contention in a stagnant economy. In other words, those first on the scene could reward themselves and their clients. The competition for profitable state offices unleashed a deadly race within the petitbourgeois elite, which became fragmented into the smallest units possible, namely individuals, thereby corroding the common project of this emerging class -the creation of a stable political environment and growing economy-and entangling themselves and the Somali people in fruitless strife. The state, which mediates conflict between competing social groups in advanced capitalist societies, was here both the object and the price of the struggle.
The main way to get access to state funds was to become an elected political representative or, even better, a minister, and this goes a long way to explain the increase in both the number of parties and candidates in the i964 and i969 elections. Attempts by the Prime Minister to prevent further fragmentation of the political process did not bear fruit, mainly because of the popular understanding that the up-coming contests were all about the privatizationn' of state largesse -indeed, many senior civil servants resigned in order to participate in the electoral gamble. The proliferation of political parties was a product of this process, and in the absence of any philosophical differences among the elite, they collectively used clanship as a means of distinguishing one candidate from another.
The effectiveness of blood-ties to mobilise voters had its limits, given the fact that the competition was intense even within such groups. For instance, since many people realised that these exercises in elite pluralism had nothing to offer the country, it became part of the norm that most personal costs incurred, including even the time spent in going to the polling stations, had to be paid for by the candidates seeking election. In most, if not all cases, the appeal for blood-ties had to be supplemented by the distribution of cash to influential individuals, especially during the final days of the campaign.
The Somali Youth League emerged victorious from the I969 elections, with 73 of the I23 seats. However, immediately after the results had been declared, virtually all of the supposed differences between the political parties disappeared, and a feverish competition ensued among those members of National Assembly who wished to recoup their expenses and a lot more. The best way to do so was to gain access to the central chambers of state power, and this helps to explain the rapidity with which all those in the 'opposition', except the former Premier, Abdirazak Hadji Hussein, 'crossed the floor' to join the ruling party.
In a nutshell, this endless search and competition for resources swiftly transformed what seemed to many political commentators of the time to be a promising democratic society into one of Africa's single-party states. Given the expensiveness of campaigning for a parliamentary seat, the ruling clique was quite conscious of its increasing leverage over future candidates for high public office. Even so, because the state revenues that could be used to induce political support were very limited, there was always the possibility that enough disgruntled members could bring the Government down, as happened in i964 and I967. Therefore, it was imperative that important changes in the political process be brought about to save the system from consuming itself. In essence this meant shedding the 'democratic', if not the electoral, paraphernalia, and imposing a petit-bourgeois dictatorship on the Somali society that required the support of the army.
Shortly after the elections, the Prime Minister made well-publicised inspection trips to the military headquarters in Mogadishu, and reportedly planned to send some senior officers to be trained in the Soviet Union and/or to force them into retirement so that they could be replaced by his own men. This scheme was aborted by the assassination of the President, Abdirashid 'Ali Shirmarke, in October ABDI ISMAIL SAMATAR I969, and by the ensuing squabble among members of the party and the National Assembly that allowed the army to step in and to end the confusion. What seemed immediately attractive to the public was the termination of the proliferating political parties by the Supreme Revolutionary Council (S.R.C.), followed by the associated privatisation of public resources. What very few people knew at the time was that General Muhammed Siyad Barre had partaken in the old spoils, and that his Soviet-style socialist programmes had little to do with the Xeer-bound traditions of the past.
Although the S.R.C. soon began to lose popularity, there was no apparent challenge to Siyad Barre and his junta, apart from an alleged 'palace coup' in July I972. But the reputation of the military regime was shattered by the defeat of Somali troops in the Ogaden during I977-8, and this re-opened the political competition among the elite, most of whom were senior members of the administration. The ensuing struggle for power became deadlier this time, as both the Government and the opposition were inclined to use bullets to retain or gain access to the resources of the state, rather than the ballot box and bribes. The departure of the Soviets discredited the rhetoric of scientific socialism, and by the end of the decade the regime had come around to singing the tunes of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, thus pre-empting any possible use of such ideology by the opposition.
By this time those in and out of power had, ironically, similar 'economic programmes', and the resources of the state were being increasingly misappropriated on a grand scale. Knowing that his regime had no chance of winning in any democratic and competitive election, the President openly turned to the brutal repression and prosecution of any possible opposition. Having purged the military and appointed loyalists and immediate family members to all key positions, he then used civil service posts and public funds to reward and punish other opportunistic members of the elite. Having desecrated Somali nationalism and abandoned the need for popular legitimacy, Siyad Barre and his clients set about manufacturing a base of support through blood-ties and political oppression.
The destruction of the state as the instrument for ensuring the safety of common citizens, and the collective punishment of communities deemed disloyal, left an institutional vacuum in the country. Rather than safeguarding the public, the state became an arbitrary and unpredictable predator to be feared. Unfortunately, and not surprisingly, the opposition failed to fill the void, and did not offer the Somali people an alternative vision of a better and achievable future.
They followed 'Siyad, the teacher', as many Somalis contemptuously referred to the dictator, and also relied on blood-ties as their principal organizational safeguard. The fragmentation of the opposition along these lines kept the regime in power for almost another decade. The terror of the military, the collapse of public law and order, and the fragmentation of the opposition, meant that ordinary people were forced to find protection in the ghost of pre-colonial kinship tradition, the clan.
The colonisation of the state by the loyalists, whose only purpose was to stay in power in order to ransack public property, led to the emergence of localised nodes of coercive power, the precipitous decline of central authority, and ultimately the incapacitation of the last source of power, the military. The complete 'success' of the regime's strategy of divide-and-rule through blood-ties in the end consumed its own strength, thereby leading to the total collapse of governmental authority.
The anticipated 'second coming' of independence after the downfall of the military regime did not materialism. The shortsighted opportunism of leading members of the opposition led them to become engulfed in a struggle over whatever was left of the carcass of the state.20 The chaos which surrounded the last days of the Government as the United Somali Congress (U.S.C.), one of the opposition factions in the southern region, made its final push into the presidential palace, foreshadowed the eventual descent into a savage civil war. The purpose of the U.S.C. seems to have been, in hindsight, to oust Siyad Barre without any carefully thought-out plans to repair the institutional capacity of the state and immediately restore civil peace. Having carelessly and widely distributed arms to undisciplined and untrained supporters, and without a contingency programme for restoration and reconstruction, Siyad Barre was temporarily defeated, the U.S.C. declared itself the victor in January 199I, and Ali Mahdi was capriciously appointed as the new President.
The young vigilantes who had been armed by the U.S.C. began to ransack both public and private property, and within two months of Siyad Barre's departure they destroyed more people and property than the military regime had done in 20 years. The central figures of the U.S.C. were powerless to control the very people they had supplied with weapons. The looters told many home-owners whose property ABDI ISMAIL SAMATAR they occupied, 'Ana Xoreestey', which literally means, 'I liberated it for myself'. With the destruction of the national co-ordinating centre of administration, all the opposition movements claimed sovereignty over their supposed 'native areas', thus completing the dismemberment of the Somali state. Each warlord dreamed of replacing Siyad Barre, and since there can only be one central seat of power in a unitary country, intra-faction conflicts ensued, reminiscent but more deadly than those witnessed in the highly competitive elections held in i969. This process left the country fractured, and instigated hatred based on blood-ties not previously recorded in the annals of Somali history.
As each potentate tries to overtake and weaken his competitors, the social fabric is destroyed, as well as the basic life-sustaining physical infrastructure. The inability of the faction leaders to provide for their undisciplined militias has turned the 'troops' into roaming gangs whose only ethic is loot, rape, maim, and destroy. Consequently, onethird to one-half of the Somali population are in grave danger of dying by starvation caused by this completely avoidable havoc. While the people perish, the warlords keep the United Nations and other relief organizations at bay for fear that their enemies may win support and recognition.
In addition to the unforgivable and unforgettable cruelty of the warlords in the south, the Somali National Movement (S.N.M.) in the north has spent over $6o,ooo in the United States in commissioning a firm of consultants to try and convince the international community that the original inhabitants of the former British Somaliland were all members of the Isaaq clan, and that 'their territory' has legitimate historical claim to sovereignty and hence statehood. As factional rivalry proliferates, as the ability of the commanders to provide for their clients declines, and as all public norms of civility and respect for the lives of others vanish, so social and individual paranoia simply merge. Thus, in spite of the supposed power of the loyalty of blood-ties, the rules of the jungle, everyone against all, become supreme. This is the barbarism to which Aw Jama Omer Issa and Ahmed Samatar have referred.
The most important lesson to be learned from the present tragedy is the recognition that Somali society has been torn apart because bloodties without the Xeer have been manipulated by the elite in order to gain or retain access to unearned resources. The fundamental basis of pre-colonial social justice was the self-reliance of the household, coupled with systemic checks on those who wanted to aid the resources of others. This is not a plea for a return to a tradition that is dead, but an argument about the need to work for a different future where the security and the dignity of every citizen is the principal tenet of the law of the land.
The difficult task of reconstruction has two components: (i) to create an economy in which productive resources are widely distributed, and which channels resources towards productive investment; and (ii) to craft a political order which is accountable, representative, and entrepreneurial, and that does not allow for the personal appropriation of public resources. The warlords who dominate the country, and their associated movements, have neither the vision nor the capacity to undertake such a momentous project. In the absence of an organised indigenous agency which can establish peace and carry out such an agenda in the immediate future, the Somali people must rely on the international community to save them from the horrors and the savagery of petit-bourgeois fascism.24
